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Work, Agriculture, and the Rise of Female House Seclusion in
Post-Colonial Hausaland.

Introduction: Women, Power, and Kulle. 1

With this paper I hope to explore the relationship between the seclusion of
married won1en among the Hausa of northern Nigeria and southern Niger and
the economic changes that occurred in these regions after colonialism. This
study will have two main goals. The first will be to suggest a link between the
introduction of a capitalist/cash econon1Y by the British and the French and the
rapid spread of wife seclusion during the same period. The second will be to
examine women's economic activity within seclusion and the ways in which
such activity paradoxically both affirms and challenges the patriarchal
hegemony that enables their seclusion. More specifically, I hope to show how
the practice of secluding married women may be understood, in part, as the
result of a reshaping of public space into "male" space, which is also economic
space. I hold to the idea that to fully understand house seclusion one must
evaluate the religious, cultural, and gender aspects of the practice. However, I
believe that a study of the change in economic roles in Hausaland2 , specifically
the changes that occurred in agriculture at the same time that seclusion was
gaining momentum as a cultural practice, may help us account for its rapid
expansion among the Hausa within the last century.

If house seclusion is evaluated in terms of its effects, one of which is the
I Rausa term for the seclusion of married women. Three major types of Kulle exist in varying forms of
severity. They are discussed in detail in the following pages.
2 Hausaland is the geographic area of Southern Nigeria and Northern Niger that contains the bulk of the
Hausa ethnic group. Though at periods ostensibly united, the term Hausaland did not necessarily mark a
political entity but, literally, the region the Rausa ethnic/linguistic group inhabited. The British and French
divided Hausaland roughly in the middle when forming the separate colonies of Niger and Nigeria (Miles
1994).
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limiting of women's access to economic autonon1Y, then one might reasonably
question if it were not, in part, adopted for specifically this purpose. If this is
the case, then one must also examine the persistence of women's economic
activity (women continue to sell goods produced in the home in street markets
run by their children) in two ways. In as much as such activity enables women
to gain a degree of economic autonomy it must be seen as a counterhegemonic
force that undermines the economic barriers raised by seclusion. Yet, in as
much as such activity finances the household (which seclusion can render
expensive since tasks that might have otherwise been performed by the wife
must be hired done) it also subsidizes the very institution it purports to
undermine.

An exhaustive study of the ideas that I introduced above is beyond the
scope of this project. As such I would like to state now the perimeters and
limitations of the study which follows. I have divided my treatment of the topic
into two sections. The first is a research project that deals with a survey of the
published literature on house seclusion. I do not posit that the survey is a
complete review of all published literature on house seclusion, but I do believe I
treat many of the main texts. Working from the bibliographies of the most
recent articles I found published on seclusion, I evaluate what seem to be the
most widely discussed authors. My emphasis in this section is on the factors-religious, economic, and political-- that influenced the rise of house seclusion
within the last century.

In the second part I include a discussion of my own observations of a
small, rural Rausa village in southern Niger. While in Niger I worked with a
Caucasian American woman who had been sent by the Peace Corps into Dadun
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Serki as a "Women's Community Coordinator." In this capacity, she had been
instructed to assist women in developing social and economic programs that
would enable them to gain a greater degree of autonomy. I cannot over
emphasize the overtly "western" nature of this project, both in goals and in
practices. It was through watching how such projects reshaped the lives of the
participants involved that I was confirmed in the idea suggested to me by my
previous reading, namely that the adoption of certain colonial practices often
viewed by the west as "liberatory' can paradoxically strengthen other existing
cultural practices that westerners see as "oppressive." While I believe my
observations may be used to enhance my discussion of house seclusion, I can in
no way propose that one small village in southern Niger can speak for all of
Hausaland. In evaluating the rise of house seclusion in a particular area, factors
as diverse as the height of the watertable and the distance of the village from
major markets must be considered, since Hausa women are often responsible
for procuring supplies for cooking, even while strictly secluded. Obviously in a
region as economically and culturally diverse as Hausaland (which comprises
farming villages of less than a hundred as well as Kano city of several million,
and stretches over a vast territory in both Niger and Nigeria) cannot be summed
up neatly in one small village. At the same time I believe that my observations
are not entirely diminished by the limited scope of my study, and at the very
least suggest issues that further-more exhaustive-studies may find helpful.
Part I
Background: Settings and Systems
Anyone familiar with the study of Islam in Hausaland will be familiar with the
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term Kulle. Translated directly from the Hausa Kulle means "to lock," but in
colloquial use it has come to refer widely to the practice of wife seclusion that
is almost ubiquitous in Northern Nigeria, and present in varying degrees
throughout the rest of Hausaland. Though Kulle is practiced in some form or
other throughout the Islamic world, this paper is concerned with its occurrence
in Hausaland where, surprisingly, within less than a century it went from being
a highly specific (the wives of Malams 3 and chiefs) to a nearly ubiquitous
practice (Callaway 1984, p 432). Most of the literature on Kulle is focused on
Kano and Northern Nigeria, where some scholars estimate that nearly 90
percent of married women practice Kullen Tsari (literally: "lock seclusion") in
which movements are restricted to escorted nighttime visits to other wonlen or
to important occasions such as naming cerenl0nies, funerals, and weddings.
Niger, however, is a different story altogether. Although the village
where I stayed is only fifty kilometers from Kano, no more than a small per
cent of the women were practicing Kulle in any form. Questioning a dozen or
more Peace Corps volunteers posted in villages around Niger, I found that most
were familiar with the practice, but had not encountered many households
where wives were secluded. Much of the introductory labor for this paper will
be to explore why such profound differences in practice exist within the same
ethnic group. I want to return to Niger momentarily. However, because most

3

The term Malam in Hausa refers to an Islamic religious leader.
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of the published literature on seclusion is focused on Nigeria an introductory
analysis of the theories regarding the rise of Kulle must begin there.
Kulle and the Male Gendering of Public Space

Kulle is n10st widely understood as a religious practice. As such, most

proponents of Kulle refer to Islamic law for their legitimization. They turn to
verses such as the one found in Sura IV of the Qur'an which states:
Men have authority over women because Allah has made the one
superior to the others, and because they spend their wealth to maintain
them. Good women are obedient. The guard their unseen parts because
Allah has guarded them (Qur an 4: 34).
t

More to the point is verse 33:33 which reads: "Stay in your homes and do not
display your finery as women used to do in the days of ignorance."
The anlbiguity of such verses often leads to various--often antagonistic-interpretations of Kulle. In Hausaland Kulle is most often interpreted in three
ways. Kullen Tsari, as I have already mentioned, restricts the movement of
married women to occasional, escorted participation in important ceremonies,
and then only after dark. Kullen Dinga (literally "lock keep on doing") forbids
any outside movement at all and is usually restricted to the wives of prominent
politicians or religious leaders. On the opposite extreme, Kullen Zuchi is
practiced by relatively few women (in northern Nigeria) within the class of
educated elites. Translated as "lock of the heart" it allows for free movement
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of women who are entrusted to practice proper morality on their own (Reynolds
1992, 3).

For the rest of the paper when I refer to Kulle I am referring to

Kullen Tsari or Kullen Dinga, the practices which literally restrict women's

movement outside of the compound.
Interpretations of seclusion can range therefore from completely
restricted mobility to simply restricted dress, or at the most lenient extreme,
"restrictions" which are manifested as simply the encouragement of good
thoughts and actions. The freedom of interpretation which the Qu'ran allows on
the point of seclusion explains the existence of widely divergent practices in
different Islamic countries which are, ideally, subject to the exact same laws.
However, it does not explain why such different interpretations are brought
about in a particular culture, or why one culture would choose one
interpretation over another. Thus the rise of house seclusion in northern
Nigeria, and its comparative absence in Niger, cannot be completely understood
through an Islamic framework. One must look to cultural analysis to fill in the
gaps left by an entirely religious explanation.
To the degree that scholarship on Kulle approaches the subject of origins
and the evolution of the institution it falls into two main interpretive
franleworks. The first, made popular by M.G. Smith in 1954, is the Piety/
Prestige argument which explains the adoption of Kulle as a response to
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growing class consciousness due to the abolition of slavery4. Kulle, understood
through this paradigm, functioned in order to distinguish married free women
from slave women, both married and single, (who were forced to work in the
fields), as well as to express Islamic piety (which in sonle circles acquired a
comnlodified status at least as prestigious as wealth).
Feminist scholars have often been unsatisfied with this explanation which
de-emphasizes the patriarchal structure of both Rausa culture and Islam. Of
greater interest to such scholars, such as Barbara Cooper and Barbara Callaway
who have written extensively on the subject, is the structural nature of the
institution, and the way in which the stratification of gender roles and the
existence of a male dominated hierarchy have effected the spread of Kulle.
Conceivably, Smith's explanation could be read as gender neutral, with women
voluntarily choosing to enter Kulle to express their families' wealth and piety,
and to distinguish themselves from ordinary laborers. Without denying the
viability of this explanation for some situations, it is important to convey the
lack of choice which characterizes most women's experience with Kulle - a
subject I turn to later.
In addition to elucidating the tenets of these two major theories, the maIn
thrust of this work will be to explore the relationship of gender roles to economic
productivity -- a relationship I feel is crucial to understanding the rapid spread of

4

According to Hill, slavery was never outlawed outright. Several bans were placed on slave trading and
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Kulle in the years following colonialism. In the paradigm I propose, Kulle served

as a tool for the male gendering of agriculture specifically, and public space lTIOre
generally, as the colonial introduction of cash crops and cash economy rendered
farming an increasingly lucrative enterprise. This sharp masculinization of public
space not only left women disassociated from the means of economic autonomy,
but was perhaps adopted, at least in part, specifically for this purpose.

One of the greatest challenges for any study of Kulle in Northern Nigeria is to
account for its rise in the last century. Barbara Callaway wrote in 1984 that over
"95 percent of the women in Kano city live in Purdah 5 (seclusion) (431)." And
Polly Hill, in her study, Rural Hausa, reiterates Callaway's figures stating:
"virtually all won1en of child-bearing age in the gari ... are in full Muslim seclusion
(1972 22-23)." These figures are exceptional for anyone familiar with reports
from travelers, anthropologists, and colonial workers from the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries. Jonathan Reynolds asserts that, "Prin1ary sources, such
as traveler's accounts and popular stories establish a pre-expansion baseline" and
draws upon Polly Hill's excerpt from the journal of British traveler C.H. Robinson
who visited Nigeria in the late 1800's (Reynolds 4). On the subject of Kulle
Robinson wrote: "with the exception of [the wives oil the king and one or two of
his chief ministers, [the women] are not kept in seclusion, but are allowed to go

raiding beginning in 1901. She estimates that slavery "died a natural death" about 1930.
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about as they please (Hill 1972, 259)." His account suggests that wife seclusion
was highly specific to certain public figures. Issues of class are not even involved
at this point, as it is not the upper classes which practice seclusion, but only
prominent figures. Hill locates the expansion of Kulle at an even later date, writing
in 1972 that "only fifty years before" Kulle was restricted to wives of Malams
(ibid)."
Pinpointing more exact dates for the expansion of Kulle would be useful for a
more precise evaluation of its causes, but for this study it suffices to reiterate that
within the last century it has gone from being a highly specific to a nearly
ubiquitous practice. Therefore scholars who attempt to account for the expansion
of Kulle must consider the social changes of Nigeria within the last century. For
M.G. Smith the pivotal issue is the abolition of slavery by the British. He states,

With the abolition of slavery under British rule, women fornlerly of
slave status withdrew from the farms and as far as possible from woodgathering as an assertion of their new legal status as free persons, and in
imitation of the traditional role of free Hausa women. Linked with this
development is the spread of Purdah-type marriages throughout the rural
areas of Hausaland in recent years, for the seclusion of wives is closely
connected with their refusal, whenever possible, either to farm or gather
sylvan produce, and their preference for the more rewarding trade and
craft activities which they can carry out in the leisure time at home
(Smith 22, cited in Callaway 1984).

For Smith the abolition of slavery enabled women who were formally forced to

5

Purdah is an Islamic/Arabic term for seclusion. Kulle is Hausa.
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labor in the fields to marry and, in their imitation of free Hausa women, withdraw
into the more respectable life of seclusion. Such an analysis is partially convincing,
especially in that it corresponds to the oft-cited disdain most Muslinl Hausa--nlale
and female--seem to have for free women's agricultural work. As early as 1896
Robinson documented that: "farm work is not becoming for a wife you know, she
is free, you may not put her to hoe grass as a slave (Callaway 1987, 59)." Smith's
thesis seems useful, in one sense, for explaining this fact of women's absence from
the agricultural space in 1990's Hausaland, especially in light of women's
dominance in this arena in closely related societies. In the Sokoto caliphate, one of
the world's largest slave holding societies, where it is estimated that anywhere
from one third to one half (Hill 1976, 397) of the inhabitants were slaves before
colonialism began in earnest in the 1890's, it is assumed that the abundance of
slave labor would allow for free women to disassociate themselves from
agriculture in a way that women in other Muslim communities nearby6 could not.
Because the water table is high enough in Nigeria to allow for most cOlnpounds to
have their own wells, and the donkey was widespread as a beast of burden, women
"did not have to play this role as they do in so many other peasant societies" and
there was virtually no physical reason for women to remain unsecluded (Callaway
1987, 59). The argument, then, is that slave women, now free from agricultural

I later review an article by Jean AUman in which she deals with female agricultural laborers in Ghana., as
well as an article in which Gina Porter addresses the issue of seclusion and agricultural labor in Borno.
Also, southern Niger was not the sight of large slave holding farms because of the harsher climate, more
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obligations 7, are inspired by class consciousness and Islamic piety to enter into
seclusion.
Smith's thesis, though, is highly problematic in many ways. First, it best
explains why women are not involved in agriculture, but it does not really describe
why the alternative to agriculture is seclusion. It seems that women could
withdraw fron1 agriculture in other ways than seclusion, and references to other
African groups, such as the Kanuri in Borno, where Muslim women have a
pronounced role in the market, strengthen this position (Porter 488). Second, it
assumes that all free women before the dissolution of slavery were in seclusion. As
previous sources indicate, only the wives of Malams and political leaders were
practicing Kulle. Primary documents which detail the lives of free won1en in the
pre-colonial period would be useful at this point, but most are silent on this issue.
However, it seems that if most free women were not in seclusion, as Robinson and
others indicate, then the dissolution of slavery would hardly trigger a wholesale
expansion of Kulle based on class-consciousness. It is highly likely that slave
women would try to imitate free women, yet it is not clear that a requisite
characteristic of free women was Kulle.

hostile to large-scale farming.
Again, the law that abolished slave trading in 1901 did not abolish slave holding. Slave holding, as Hill
suggests, died of its own accord about thirty years later. I assume Smith refers to this period of slavery's
diminishing importance as the period in which slave women were freed. Without the ability to buy, sell, or
trade slaves, one might hypothesize that slaves could more easily escape without the fear of being resold.
In addition, the slave system was more related to our notions of sharecropping than of slavery, many slaves
bought their own land and their freedom with their portion of the returns from the small sections of land
allotted to them (Hill 1972, 200).
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I return to these problematic aspects of Smith's thesis momentarily, for now,
though, it is important to point out the largest gap in Smith's primarily economic
account of the rise of Kulle; namely, the lack of attention to gender relations in
Hausa culture, and his inability to account for the lack of choice most women feel
in regard to Kulle. As I have already mentioned, Smith paints the picture of women
gracefully retreating into Kulle for a much sought after rest from the drudgery of
agricultural labor. Callaway and others point out how this explanation ignores the
subordination of women in Hausaland. In her article "Socialization and Seclusion
of Hausa Women, It Callaway expounds upon the social subordination of women
which makes Kulle seem inevitable. Such socialization begins at a very young age
and involves a complex interworking of direct signs, such as when girls are told:
"no matter what you do you are going to someone else's house," or: "you are a
woman and you are under someone else's authority," and culturally encoded
signifiers, such as when young girls are trained to act as little women and taught to
speak softly, cover their heads, and sit modestly (1984, 435-36).

Callaway is

explicit about this process, writing:

Thus, in childhood little girls are rigidly sex-stereotyped and taught
'appropriate' behavior which is, in fact, counter to human dignity,
They are made to feel that they are inherently inferior, that they are
but temporary residents in their own honles, and that they will
always 'belong' to somebody, and hence are not entitled to equal
status or treatment, either in society or in law (ibid).
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Again drawing upon Callaway we find,
As an institution, wife seclusion is most prevalent in poorer
countries and seems to be particularly accommodated by societies
characterized by a fairly rigid social structure based on highly
differentiated, hierarchically ordered ascriptive roles. In Hausa
society, hierarchical relationships establish patterns of social distance
and psychological subservience between social classes within the
society and between men and women. Placing women in their
"proper" place is an essential component of the sense of order, The
social world is segregated between n1en and women's spheres, and
deep seated religious beliefs regarding basic human nature sanction
this segregation (Callaway 1987, 56).

Authors who emphasize this structural nature of Kulle are left with a
dilemma of their own. Unless they assert that this gender disparity is a recent
phenomena, they are left to account for why Kulle would just become widespread
within the last century. Before, free women were allowed to "go about as they
pleased."

Usually such authors turn again to Smith's Piety/Prestige theory

stressing economics, augmenting it to give proper attention to women's
subordinate socialization (Callaway 1984, 1987, Polly lfill 1972).

Even so,

Callaway's structural argument does not wholly apply to the situation of Northern
Nigeria. Far from being one of the poorest countries, Nigeria actually has a
comparatively high GNP, at least in relation to its neighbors. In fact, it seems that
the influx of wealth, and the introduction of a cash economy by the British, must
be son1ehow related to the spread of Kulle, as they occurred simultaneously. 8 The

Different authors give different dates for the introduction of a cash economy. For Portor the pivito\ issue
is the introduction of groundnuts which began around 1900. Oluwasanmi indicates that the cash economy

8

14

absence of K ulle in areas in Niger which are culturally similar to Nigeria--both are
Hausa and Muslim, both dominated by patriarchal hierarchy--only reinforces this
correlation. Again, we must turn to economics for a more exhaustive explanation,
and one which takes into account the lack of choice women have in relation to
seclusion.

Gina Porter, in a much more recent economic evaluation of the rise of Kulle,
seems to solve some of the problems of Smith's original thesis, while still relying
on his explanation of the expansion of Kulle as a class-conscious retreat from
slavery.

She explains how Hausaland became the center of the groundnut

production in the British colonial empire and thus provided inhabitants with
enough money to hire field laborers, releasing women from the necessity of field
work. The fact that groundnut production requires a great deal of labor in the
shelling of nuts and can be done from in the compounds furthers the viability of

Kulle (488). In the same line of reasoning, Porter speculates that the collapse of
slavery created a surplus of labor which left women, both free and slave, in a
situation where their productive capacity would be devalued. Such a devaluation
would make it easy to sweep women into lives of seclusion, especially if existing
Islamic norms and patriarchal social structures already sanctioned such a nlove.

arrived with the British even before the 1890 agreement with France that divided West Africa between the
French and the British. At any rate, the change to a cash economy began with the colonial influence around
the turn of the century and was flourishing by the time the British and French left the area in the 1950's.
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Obviously many cultural factors must be considered. However, as Sluith's and
Porter's evaluation of Kulle indicates, women's relationship to agriculture appears
to be a fundanlental factor influencing the spread of Kulle. Certainly there appears
to be a link between the fact that seclusion is more widely practiced in Hausaland,
where women are agriculturally marginal, than in other areas such as Borno and
Ghana, which have similar Islamic cultures, but where wonlen have a large role in
agricultural production. Seclusion seenlS to be hinged then, at least on one level,
on the male gendering of agriculture. Even Smith's thesis was grounded in an
analysis of agricultural roles. Yet Smith's theory that women wanted to distance
themselves from agriculture due to class-consciousness only goes so far. The
introduction of cash crops nlade agriculture the most profitable domain at the time.
We must at least question if issues of pride and class-consciousness would have
overridden the desire for the wealth and affluence that cash crops could have
provided. Several other theories might be useful at this point. For one, I posit that
the structural argunlent that Callaway presents may be used to explain how a male
hegemony would attempt to reduce women's presence in agriculture, as it would
represent female access to cash economy and thus reduce their dependence on
nlen.

Agriculture, Capitalism and the Introduction of Kulle

Kulle also showed a rapid expansion during this same period.
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Women's role in agriculture in relation to Kulle has been given little attention in
the literature on Kulle because it is commonly assun1ed that Hausa women do not
want to be involved in agriculture, or that agriculture has always been a male
domain. Sources such as Staudinger stated in 1889, as Polly Hill puts it, "without
further elaboration, that farming was men's not women's work (1972, 335).
Callaway writes that "Early writers establish that a prohibition against 'free
women' working in the fields is long-standing. For the past eight decades,
commentators on the scene in Nigerian Hausaland have noted it with interest
(1887, 59)." She reviews the accounts of several travelers and ethnographers from
the late eighteenth century until 1960 and then concludes, "Hausa women in
Nigeria simply do not farm (59-60)."
However, contrary to these assertions Hill acknowledges that "the question of
the extent to which free women cultivated the gandu farms is quite obscure," and
goes on to point out how Baba of Kar0 9(Mary Smith 1954, p41 quoted in Hill
1972) relates that all members of her family were involved in farming operations.
Hill's assertion, and the example of the famous study Baba of K.aro, problematize
the assumption that free women were absent from the agricultural production
Whatever the case may have been for free women (which is actually quite

9 Saba of Karo is a well known study of one rural Hausa woman's life conducted by Mary Smith when she
accompanied her husband M.G. Smith to Nigeria, where he was also doing ethnographic research on the
Hausa. It was published in 1954.
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important to most Kulle theorists since Smith's thesis is dependent upon free
women not working in fields) it is certain that slave women were agricultural
laborers. M.G. Smith clearly makes this assertion. (M.G. Smith 1955, 22-24)
Therefore, the division of labor in agriculture was clearly not entirely gender based
in the pre-colonial period

to

The mystery surrounding the actual agricultural

position of free women may always remain for lack of primary sources, however,
our uncertainty on this point makes it clear that we cannot sinlply ignore the
implications of a male gendering of the agricultural domain, or assume that such a
gendering has always existed. With this in mind, the idea that slave women--who
had previously been agriculturally involved-- would voluntarily flee agriculture as
soon as it became profitable is called into question, especially as the nonagricultural status of free women (whom the slaves would supposedly try to
emulate) is challenged by sources such as Baba. Further, as mentioned earlier,
whether or not free women worked in the fields, all were certainly not in seclusion.
Emulating free women, then, nlight involve the withdrawal from agriculture--but
not the embrace of the institution of Kulle. Perhaps for a better explanation of the
rise of Kulle, then, we should, as Michel Foucault suggested in his study of prisons
in Europe, Discipline and Punish, look to the effects of the rise of house seclusion,
rather than its "causes." One effect has undoubtedly been to limit women in the
public space--space made increasingly valuable by capitalism, cash crops, and the

10

Miles defines the Pre-Colonial period as the period before the 1890 agreement between France and
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cash economy--where they would have the possibility for financial independence.
Certainly, female independence has been the result of increased agriculture
value in areas of Borno, (Porter 490), where population shortages precluded the
institution of Kulle as women were needed to work in the fields. The increased
value of their labor, Porter speculates, "may well account for the spirit of
independence, associated with a high divorce rate [initiated by the women],
exhibited by many Borno women (Ibid)." Atempts to limit women's econonlic
autonomy after the introduction of cash crops made such autonomy possible would
not be without precedent in the Muslim world. Jean Allman reveals how in postcolonial Ghana there were periods where all unmarried wonlen were rounded up
and arrested until someone agreed to nlarry them. Allman asserts that this attack on
"spinsters" (her word) was an attempt to curb women's economic independence
represented by their increasing ability to support themselves outside of marriage
with their agricultural skills (Allman 1993). While Ghana and Borno are not direct
cultural correlates to Northern Nigeria, the research of Allman and Porter reveals a
necessity to consider the importance of agriculture roles, especially after the
introduction of cash crops, to issues of autonomy and independence. Primary
docunlents reporting the curbing of women's agricultural involvement would
strengthen this argument, but even in the absence of such documents, such a theory
can be useful in explaining discrepancies in the dominant accounts of the rise of

Britain dividing the territories of West Africa (Miles 1994, introduction).
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Kulle.
It is Iny contention that this sudden adoption of house seclusion was not

only the natural result of cultural and religious patriarchal structures which were
allowed to assert themselves with greater force after the dissolution of slavery,
though these certainly came into play, nor of women and men attenlpting to define
their new class/religious status, though again, this was inevitably a factor. I think
one should explore the possibility that Kulle is at least partially the result of the
introduction of a capitalist/cash economy that privileged public space, both for
agriculture and trade. The influx of wealth fronl such an economy would not only
provide the Ineans for seclusion, but the impetus as well, as limiting women's
access to this wealth would become fundamental to maintaining patriarchal
dominance. It is for this reason that Kulle, which sharply genders public (male)
and private space (feminine), becomes rampant after the introduction of cash crops
and continues to thrive even after agriculture has faded in economic itnportance.
The gendering of agriculture labor and the introduction of Kulle was in fact, a
broader gendering of public labor and public space--and must be considered as
such if the dilemma of its rise in the modern period is to be properly understood.
In conclusion, I do not want to take too narrow a view of the rise of Kulle
In Northern Nigeria. My attempt to provide an economic paradigm which
accounts for the spread and rise of Kulle was not nleant to supplant other
theories, but to complement them. In reality it was a variety of influences which
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led to the adoption of Kulie. A cultural phenomena of this sort is necessarily
complex. In addition, the cultural differences between Niger and Nigeria are
greater than economic. Although less in evidence now due to recent econon1ic
and social hardships, the seventies found Nigeria in a moment of increased
nationalist sentiment. It is possible that such nationalism might lead to the
adoption of practices such as Kulie, as Islamic nationalists would be seeking to
strengthen cultural practices which distinguish themselves from other nations,
practices such as Kulle which are often perceived as uniquely Nigerian.
Similarly, Reynolds emphasizes that Nigeria has many large competing ethnic
and religious groups. The Muslim's close proximity to Christians and "pagans,"
for example, n1ight fuel the instigation of practices such as seclusion which
visibly demonstrate one's Islamic commitment. With such religious diversity,
visible signs of one religious orientation would be valuable (Reynolds 1992).
And finally one cannot ignore a well documented trend in Northern Nigeria
towards a more "Islamist" (read fundamentalist l !) interpretation of Islam. These
factors, which are not so acutely present in Niger, must undoubtedly account for
differences in seclusion between the two nations.
At the san1e time, however, it is not only important to note the differences
between the disparate theories, but also how they may overlap. I hypothesize that
a cash economy not only brought with it the means for seclusion, with an

II

By fundamentalist I am referring to the idea that Muslims must adhere to a literal interpretation of the
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increase in production, but may have been responsible for an entire paradigm
shift in which the individual, as entrepreneur and worker, is praised and
aggrandized ... Kulle is this light could be seen as expressing a wife's and her
husband's singular devotion, as well as their wealth. For this reason, a reading
of the correlation between Kulle and capitalism is especially seductive. While
one must emphasize that Nigeria is far from fully embracing the rugged
individualism of the west, it is possible to see the changes brought about by
industrialization played out on the Nigeria concept of self. Consider the
following description of this process by a Nigerian economist:

The first important effect is on the gradual change of the traditional
value system, beliefs and religion. The introduction of the
monetary economy .... replaced the trade by barter type of economy
which traditional Nigeria was used to.
Then later he states:
Industrialization has resulted in individualism unknown to
traditional Nigeria. Group consciousness which was characteristic
of Nigeria is being replaced by the desire of independence and the
assertion of individual right and freedom that is now most evident
(Damachi 107).

The expansion, therefore, of a paradigm which emphasizes the individual may be
seen to have facilitated the importance of issues of prestige and piety (for both
Qur'an that purports to govern not only private religious life but public life as well.
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men and women).
Finally, it is obvious that the reasons for the rise of Kulle are varied.
However, pointing out the correlation between the advent of the capitalist/cash
economy, the male gendering of public space, and Kulle provides a useful
paradigm for interpreting not only the institution itself, but women s activities
I

within it.

Part II: Personal Study, Dadun Serki, Kulle, and Women's Continuing
Economic Roles.

Understanding the rIse of Kulle as a result of the introduction of a
capitalist/cash economy goes a long way toward explaining the differences
between the way Kulle is practiced in Niger and the way it is practiced in
Nigeria, though again, it is not, by any means, an exhaustive theory. As I
mentioned previously, there is a great difference in numbers between the
adherents of Kulle in northern Nigeria and their linguistic and cultural kin just
fifty km away in Niger. In Dadun Serki, a small village just seven km outside
of Zinder, Niger's second largest city, I found only two secluded women.
Within the village there were more than 250 women who were married or of
marriageable age. Of the two who were secluded, one was allowed to carry the
water from the central well to her compound twice a day. She was the first wife

23

of the chief's brother. (The chief's wives were not secluded). The other was the
first wife of a prominent businessman in the town, the owner of one of the two
tanneries that represented Dadun Serki' s main industry.

Within Zinder,

married women were tellers at both the post office and banks. They also
operated their own stands at the market. There seemed to be little prohibition of
their movement.
Again, there are probably nlany explanations for the conlparative absence of
seclusion in Niger. In fact, in the case of Dadun Serki, almost all the issues
raised before seem to fit. Dadun Serki has not been subject to the same type of
Islamic revivalism that characterizes Nigerian Hausaland. There is not a surplus
of labor, so women are still needed to gather firewood and tend small vegetable
gardens (although, importantly, they are not allowed to tend the millet fields,
which are the main food supply, or the groundnuts, which are the main source
of agricultural income.) The water table is low, so the village only has one
central well. And beasts of burden are also not very prevalent. In addition, the
French were a lot less "lenient" on local customs than the British, and some of
the prevailing Hausa gender-structure inequities were eroded by the French,
who allowed women to attend school and take some government positions.
However, certainly one of the most astonishing differences is that of
the economy. Nigeria reaping the windfall of the oil boom of the 1970' s has
developed into a much more capitalistic society. This nleans the flow of capital
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into Nigeria has created an economy in which the primary aim of labor is no
longer subsistence farming. The Nigerian is more likely to work for an industry
and receive wages that he then uses to purchases necessities such as food,
clothing, and housing.

On the other hand, where Nigeria is ranked as one of

the more wealthy West African countries, Niger is perhaps its poorest.
Classified by the Peace Corps as one of four Fourth World countries, Niger
has, among other things, the highest infant mortality rate in the world.
Additionally, the general lack of capital has hampered the growth of a market
economy. Markets, of the traditional type scattered throughout all of West
Africa, are prevalent in Niger, but there is still a great degree of bartering
(products for products) which occurs. Niger is hardly a cash economy, and
Dadun Serki, a village in the extreme east, where the climate is harsher and the
growing season much shorter, there is little movement of currency at all.
It is not nly intention to provide an exhaustive account of the economy

of Dadun Serki. However, some background is in order so that my terms
become clear when I speak, for example, of a pre-cash economy. Such an
economy is not one entirely without monetary exchange, and does not preclude
capitalist endeavors such as store ownership, or buying low and selling high. I
consider Dadun Serki to be a pre-cash economy for the simple fact that the day
to day needs of the villagers are not satisfied through monetary purchases, and
the nlajority of the labor is subsistence labor. In other words, one's labor is
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rarely available for hire. Also, the land is commonly owned by the chief of the
village. It cannot be sold or transferred without his permission. He grants
farming plots to certain individuals, and also allocates housing resources.
Houses are built with very few "purchasable" products, such as concrete and
lumber, and can be, if one is industrious enough, constructed entirely of mud
bricks. The wealth one speaks of when referring to building a house is usually
just the land, which nlust be granted by the chief, and the labor, which must
either be purchased (which is rare) or exchanged for other labor. Food is grown
by individual families and stored for personal consumption. Cloth for making
clothing, cooking utensils, bowls, and decorative items may be purchased, but
this is often done with the exchange of goods.
Yet Dadun Serki is not impervious to the modern world. Children speak of
leaving the village to become jonctionnaires, paid workers with the government.
More and more, positions in which one's labor is sold for money are positions
which command respect and honor in the village. Peace Corps projects meant to
generate capital, such as livestock loans and community banks, are flourishing.
Children nlake slingshots that they sell in the market in order to buy Coca-Cola,
a product for which one cannot barter. There is one table store (literally the size
of a small school desk) for flour and sugar and matches. And finally, there are
two small tanneries which are, in nanle, communally held. In other words, the
money goes to the chief who, in turn, assures that the village has money for such
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expenses as maintaining the well, common vegetable gardens, or building a new
Peace Corps volunteer house (which are built from concrete and other
"purchasable" products).

However, the smallest of these tanneries is, in fact,

owned by the chief's first cousin, who is less communalist than capitalist
oriented, and expresses his personal wealth with the finest clothing and the only
automobile. And, of course, not out of character, he is married to one of the two
secluded wives.
On first glance such a village, with only two women practicing Kullen

Tsari, would seem to offer little to the analysis of house seclusion. I turn to it
because, first, I think that it is representative of what is occurring elsewhere in
Niger in regards to Kulle, and second, because of the limited number of
participants I was able to more closely research the institution, the women's
activities within it, and their general position in the village. If one is to nlake
the case, as I have attempted, that the rise of house seclusion is, at least in part,
hinged upon the development of a male-gendered cash economy, then a village
that existed in the very infancy of such an economy would provide a
opportunity to explore the beginnings of the institution. For example, I consider
it of real significance that one of the women in seclusion was the wife of a
prominent business owner.
At the same time, Dadun Serki conlpounds the problems of associating
the rise of a cash economy with the rise of Kulle, in as much as, far from being
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excluded, women seemed to be major participants in the blossoming trade-formoney industries. The general attitude toward women and economics was
progressive. Women in the village were proud of the fact that they could handle
their own households and they seemed to embrace money-making ideas
introduced by the Peace Corps. They were supported in these endeavors by the
rest of the village. They had begun making peanut butter with western recipes
and selling it to expatriates living in Zinder, and they had started a women's
caucus in which each women contributed money weekly that others were
allowed to borrow for small capitalist endeavors such as buying the peanuts for
the peanut butter, or young livestock that could then be fattened and sold at
market. This is to say that though the community was still a pre-cash
community, largely supported by subsistence farming, the roots of a Western
style capitalism seemed to be blossoming (largely with the help and influence of
outside sources, such as the Peace Corps). Women were right in the throes of
it, carving their own small niches--and, for the most part, avoiding seclusion.
A women's economy even seemed to thrive within seclusion, something
repeatedly pointed out by feminist theorists such as Hill, Callaway, and Creevy.
One of the secluded women was one of the biggest purveyors of this new peanut
butter in the Zinder market.
I want to address this apparent contradiction. In fact, there are two. If
the patriarchal nature of Hausa culture, which was still evident in Dadun Serki,
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responded to women's economic independence by circumscribing it through
seclusion, how does one explain the thriving women's market economy of
Dadun Serki and the comparative absence of seclusion? Secondly, if women are
allowed to participate in the economy even within seclusion, through the selling
of home-manufactured goods at the market, how can seclusion be truly linked to
women's economic suppression?
The first question can be answered on several levels. First, I have
already provided a list of reasons why Niger, and Dadun Serki in particular, is
fundamentally less prone to seclusion than Nigeria. Issues of water table, Islanlic
fervor, and required women's subsistence work were already explained. In
addition, the type of economic endeavors I spoke of earlier do not represent a
full fledged cash economy, or a move into an individual/labor oriented market.
For the most part, the income produced from market activities went to
supporting the household. The new peanut butter trade did not bring many new
dresses to Dadun Serki, it brought more goats for milk, or chickens, or dowries
for daughters, etc. Only in the most extreme cases were luxury goods, such as
an autonlobile, purchased. Thus, Dadun Serki did not seem to have experienced
a shift from a community in which subsistence labor was shared by many, to that
of an individualistic, labor-for-hire community. It is my contention that such a
paradigm shift is a key factor in the rise of house seclusion elsewhere in
Hausaland, and its abscence in Dadun Serki explains, in part, the relative
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absence of seclusion.
Secondly, Dadun Serki provides the perfect example for displaying how
often misogynist cultural practices (as they may be termed in the West) are not
always consciously malevolent--which is to say, they shouldn't be read as
conscious, direct conspiracies by men to limit the power of women. Most often,
as with house seclusion, they are more subtly rooted in other cultural practices
or beliefs. Although this was not the case in Ghana where women were flatly
thrown in jail for being economically independent (Allman 1993), it was more
than likely the case with house seclusion. Women were not dragged from their
profitable peanut-fields kicking and screaming into the house. The change was
the result of an entire paradigm-shift, one in which women, in more cases than
not, had also been socialized to accept.
Having said that, it is also important to point out that such a paradigmshift has real consequences. For instance, while I was visiting my friend in
Dadun Serki she was in the midst of a moral crisis concerning her work in the
village. She had been brought in as a "Woman's Community Coordinator" and
had founded many of the projects that I have mentioned. They were specifically
designed to provide women with capital in order than they might feel more
empowered to make their own decisions (it should be pointed out how
conspicuously Western the entire progran1 was, both in goals and lnethods, and
represented an intrusion into the cultural practice of the village). However, the
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project had many unwanted side effects. Some of the original women had been
forced to leave the women's caucus by their husbands, who had complained that
they were becoming too "strong-headed." In addition, one of her closest friends
in the village had been subject to several beatings by her husband which he had
attributed directly to her attitude, that he claimed had changed since her
involvement in the market projects started by the Peace Corps. One n1ust not
extrapolate too much from these examples, however, they do make clear how
entrenched patriarchal resistance in Hausaland may be to any expression of
women's independence, economic or otherwise. In such a light, the rise of Kulle
as an institution meant to limit such independence is an idea less fantastic or
conspiratorial than before.
Drawing the association between the rise of a male-dominated cash
economy and the parallel expansion of house seclusion raises another question.
Most pressing is how to account for women's work within such an analysis. One
thing is certain, women did not retire into their compounds. As in Dadun Serki,
where one of the secluded women (the wife of the chief's brother) was heavily
involved in the sale of peanut butter, such is the case throughout Hausaland.
These "honeycomb" markets, as Polly Hill describes them f10urish in areas
where seclusion is prevalent. Women are far from idle within their compounds,
and as research shows, they have founded entire mini-markets administered
through their pre-teen children in the streets. The women not only were primary

31

producers for such markets, but consunlers as well. Consider the description of
one such market:

The households in the honeycomb market are linked by children who
shop on behalf of their mothers and help determine what the prices
will be on any given day; the women are highly competitive with
each other. Women buy snacks for themselves and their children as
well as cooked food for men, and men too buy snacks and meals
throughout the day (Callaway 64).

For most scholarss considering Kulle, this powerful expression of
women's economic power within seclusion undermines any connection between
the limiting of women's economic power and the rise of house seclusion. In fact,
some propose that women may come to value this market so highly that
seclusion is rendered nlore desirable than mobility. They reason that, if
secluded, the women are prevented from doing mundane tasks, such as fetching
the water or the firewood, which the husband must hire done. The women are
then left with free time to pursue their own interests. Their argument is well
thought out, for in Islamic law, women are allowed to keep the products of their
own labor. The husband alone is responsible for the upkeep of the household.
However, such a reading does not take into account that house seclusion is
not an entirely Islamic institution. Kulle also results, as previously mentioned,
from an ingrained imbalance in gender roles prevalent in patriarchal Hausa
culture. In my discussion of Callaway on page I gave several exalnples of how

32

women were socialized to believe they were inferior to men. Inevitably this
patriarchy clashes with any religious law that nlight attenlpt to reiterate wonlen's
autonomy. Consider this statement from Polly Hill from a chapter entitled
"Seventeen Rich Men" in her 1977 book Population, Prosperity, and Poverty:

[M]any wives who are active house-traders do make significant
contributions to household expenses, especially when they are middle
aged ..... Accordingly rich husbands are particularly apt to benefit
from the increased earning power of their growing number of wives
as they get older (158).

The above statement is significant in two different ways. Primarily it displays
how women's labor within seclusion actually subsidizes the seclusion itself.
Although it is not wrong to read such trade as an expression of women's
economic autonomy, for women often use their proceeds to support themselves
after a divorce, or to make up the dowry for a marriage after divorce (268, Hill
1972), it would be a mistake to ignore how smoothly such economic expression
fits within the structure it has been credited with undermining. In Hausa Women
in the Twentieth Century Catherine Coles and Beverly Mack comment upon how
"many Hausa men cannot afford to keep their wives secluded without the income
provided by women's industry (237)."

Furthermore, as Hill's quote suggests,

many men may actually marry more wives in order to increase their wealth.
Through women's economic activity, seclusion is transformed from the
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expensive institution that it might appear to be into an often profitable enterprise
for the husband, as well as the wife.

Conclusion; theory and practice

In this paper I hoped to cover ground that I thought had been ignored by
many scholars writing about Kulle, namely the connection between the
circumscription of won1en's participation in public space and the changes that
were occurring in that space at the very time women were being expelled. In
addition, I wanted to point out how colonialism functioned in line with existing
religious and cultural practices to produce what is usually treated as an entirely
indigenous institution. In fact, in many cases Kulle is not simply Rausa, or
Nigerian, it is the result of an amalgamation of existing religious and patriarchal
cultural practices with western principles which privilege the individual.
Understanding Kulle in this light, we can better see how won1en' s continuing
economic participation in the market economy not only deconstructs, or
challenges, their expulsion from public space, it paradoxically, reaffirms it.
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